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ABSTRACT 
Botnets are prevailing mechanisms for the facilitation of the 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on computer 
networks or applications. Currently, Botnet-based DDoS 
attacks on the application layer are latest and most 
problematic trends in network security threats. Botnet-based 
DDoS attacks on the application layer limits resources, 
curtails revenue, and yields customer dissatisfaction, among 
others. DDoS attacks are among the most difficult problems to 
resolve online, especially, when the target is the Web server. 
In this paper, we present a comprehensive study to show the 
danger of Botnet-based DDoS attacks on application layer, 
especially on the Web server and the increased incidents of 
such attacks that has evidently increased recently. Botnet-
based DDoS attacks incidents and revenue losses of famous 
companies and government websites are also described. This 
provides better understanding of the problem, current solution 
space, and future research scope to defend against such 
attacks efficiently.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid development of the Internet over the past decade 
appeared to have facilitated an increase in the incidents of 
online attacks [1]. One such powerful and harmful attack is 
the denial of service (DoS) attack. A DoS attack significantly 
threatens the network, especially if such an attack is 
distributed. A distributed DoS (DDoS) attack is launched by a 
mechanism called Botnet through a network of controlled 
computers. A software program controls the computers and 
for specific purposes, known as ―bots.‖ Bots are small scripts 
that have been designed to perform specific, automated 
functions. Bots are utilized by agents for Web indexing or 
―spidering,‖ as well as to collect online product prices or to 
performing such duties as chatting. However, bots are 
negatively associated with ―remote access Trojan Horses‖ 
(e.g., Zeus bot) and zombie computers that are created for less 
favorable purposes [2]. Bots in large quantities provide the 
power of a computer to create prime tools for such activities 
as the widespread delivery of SPAM email, click-fraud, 
spyware installation, virus and worm dissemination, and 
DDoS attacks (e.g., black energy bot) [3]. DDoS attacks 
usually take advantage of the weaknesses of a network layer, 
particularly, SYN, UDP, and Internet control message 
protocol (ICMP) flooding. Such attacks encroach the network 
bandwidth and resources of the victim, thus facilitating the 
denial of legitimate access.  
A DDoS attack is exemplified by the direct attempt of 
attackers to prevent legitimate users from using a specific 
service [4]. A recent, sophisticated, and popular method of 
DDoS attack involves application level flooding, especially in 
the Web server. Such attacks employ various flooding 
methodologies (e.g., HTTP-GET flood, etc). Figure 1 shows 
the types of DDoS attacks on the application layer in 2010 
and 2011, as reported by the Arbor Inc. [5]. From the figure, 
we can see that HTTP attacks rank first in terms of number of 
incidents. HTTPs registered the highest incidence of DDoS 
attacks in 2010, reaching up to 100 Gbps in 2011. This 
increase accounts for a 700% rise in incidents, as reported by 
the Cloud Flare Company [6], where the HTTP attacks 
comprise approximately 80% in 2010, a value that 
significantly increased to approximately 88% in 2011. The 
number of daily target Web sites evidently increased, with 
government websites becoming a common target [5]. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
contains overview of the Botnet based DDoS attacks. Section 
3 presents Botnet based DDoS Attack Architecture. Botnet 
based DDoS attack tools are described in section 4. Section 5 
describes classification of Botnet based DDoS attacks in 
details. Section 6 contains various Botnet based DDoS attack 
incidents. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and presents 
further research scope.  
2. BOTNETS BASED DDOS ATTACKS 
This section provides a background on Botnets and how they 
facilitate DDoS attacks that hamper the Web server. Botnets 
compromise a network of machines with programs (usually 
referred to as a bot, zombie, or drone) and implement under a 
command and control (C&C) management infrastructure. The 
management of Botnets typically affects a series of systems 
through numerous tools and through the installation of a bot 
that can remotely control the victim using Internet relay chat 
(IRC) [7]. Present Botnets are most frequently used to spread 
DDoS attacks on the Web. Moreover, the attackers can 
change their communication approach during the creation of 
the bots. Majority of bots varied its potentials to participate in 
such attacks. The most typical and commonly implemented 
Botnet attack on application layer is the HTTP/S flooding 
attack, which launches bots created by the HTTP server. Such 
bots are thus called ―Web-based‖ bots [8]. 
The goal of a Botnet based DDoS attack is to entail damage at 
the victim side. In general, the ulterior motive behind this 
attack is personal which means block the available resources 
or degrade the performance of the service which is required 
by the target machine. Therefore, DDoS attack is committed 
for the revenge purpose. Another aim to perform these attacks 
can be to gain popularity in the hacker community. In addition 
to this, these attacks can also perform for the material gain, 
which means to break the confidentiality and use data for their 
use. 
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Fig. 1: Types of DDoS attacks on the application layer 
3. BOTNET BASWD DDOS ATTACK 
ARCHITECTURE  
Botnet based DDoS attack networks fall under three 
categories, namely, the agent-handler, IRC-based, and Web-
based models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Agent–Handler Model         
3.1 Agent-Handler Model 
The agent-handler model of a DDoS attack comprises clients, 
handlers, and agents as shown in Figure 2. The client is one 
with whom the attacker communicates in the DDoS attack 
system. The handlers are software packages located 
throughout the Internet. The client uses these packages to 
communicate with the agents. The agent software thrives in 
compromised systems, eventually conducting the attack at the 
appropriate time.        
The attacker communicates with any of the handlers to 
identify operational agents and to determine when to attack or 
to upgrade agents. Owners and users of agent systems are 
typically unaware that their system has been compromised 
and is under a DDoS attack. Depending on the configuration 
of the DDoS attack network, agents can be instructed to 
communicate with one handler or with multiple handlers. 
Attackers often attempt to install the handler software on a 
compromised router or network server. The target typically 
handles large volumes of traffic, making message 
identification difficult between the client and the handler and 
between the handler and the agents. The terms ―handler‖ and 
―agents‖ are sometimes replaced with ―master‖ and 
―demons,‖ respectively, in descriptions of DDoS tools [9].  
3.2 Internet Relay Chat (IRC) Model 
The architectures of the IRC-based DDoS attack as shown in 
Figure 3 and of the agent–handler model are almost similar. 
However, instead of employing a handler program that is 
installed on a network server, the client is connected to the 
agents through an IRC communication channel. An IRC 
channel benefits an attacker with the use of ―legitimate‖ IRC 
ports to send commands to agents. The use of legitimate ports 
hinders the tracking DDoS command packets. Additionally, 
IRC servers tend to have large volumes of traffic, enabling an 
attacker to conceal its presence easily. The attacker does not 
necessarily maintain a list of the agents because it can 
immediately enter the IRC server and view all available 
agents [10]. The agent software in the IRC network sends and 
receives messages through the IRC channel and informs the 
attacker when an agent becomes operational. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Internet Relay Chat (IRC) Model  
3.3 Web-based Model 
Although the most preferred method for Botnet command and 
control (C&C) is the IRC-based model, Web-based reporting 
and command has emerged over the past few years. A number 
of bots in the Web-based model simply report statistics to a 
Web site, whereas others are intended to be fully configured 
and controlled through complex PHP scripts and encrypted 
communications over the 80/443 port and the HTTP/HTTPS 
protocol. The following are the advantages of Web-based 
controls over IRC [11]: 
 Ease of set-up and website configuration; 
 Improved reporting and command functions; 
 Less bandwidth requirement and the acceptance of large 
Botnets for the distributed load; 
 Concealment of traffic and hindrance of filtering through 
the use of port 80/443; 
 Resistance to Botnet hijacking via chat-room hijacking; 
and 
 Ease of use and of acquisition. 
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4. BOTNETS BASED DDOS ATTACK 
TOOLS 
Various DDoS attack tools are known and architectures are 
very similar that some tools actually originate from minor 
modifications of other tools [12]. In this section, the 
functionality of a number of these tools is discussed. The 
Botnet based DDoS attack tools are classified as agent-based, 
IRC-based, or Web-based DDoS attack tools. 
4.1 Agent-based DDoS Attack Tools 
Agent-based DDoS attack tools are based on the agent–
handler DDoS attack model comprising handlers, agents, and 
victims, as described in Section 3.1. Examples of agent-based 
DDoS tools are Trinoo, Tribe Flood Network (TFN), TFN2K, 
Stacheldraht, Mstream, and Shaft [13]. Among the 
abovementioned agent-based DDoS tools, Trinoo [14] is the 
most popular and the most widely used for its capability for 
bandwidth depletion and for launching UDP flood attacks 
against one or numerous Internet protocol (IP) addresses. 
Shaft [15], on the other hand, is similar to Trinoo in that it can 
launch packet flooding attacks. Shaft can also control the 
duration of the attack, as well as the size of the flooding 
packets.  
TFN [16] is another DDoS attack tool that can conduct 
bandwidth and resource depletion attacks. TFN can perform 
Smurf, UDP flooding, TCP SYN flooding, ICMP echo 
request flooding, and ICMP directed broadcast. TFN2K [15], 
as a derivative of TFN, can perform Smurf, SYN, UDP, and 
ICMP flood attacks. TFN2K has the special capability of 
adding encrypted messages between attack components. 
Stacheldraht [17] is a product of previous TFN attempts. 
Stacheldraht strengthens a number of TFN‘s weak points and 
is capable of implementing Smurf, SYN flood, UDP flood, 
and ICMP flood attacks. On the other hand, Mstream [18] is a 
simple point-to-point TCP ACK flooding tool that can 
overwhelm fast-routing routine tables in some switches.   
4.2 IRC-based DDoS Attack Tools 
IRC-based DDoS attack tools were developed after the 
emergence of agent–handler attack tools. More sophisticated 
IRC-based tools have been developed, and these tools include 
the important features of several agent-handler attack tools. 
The Trinity is one of the best-known IRC-based DDoS tools 
on top of UDP, TCP SYN, TCP ACK, and TCP NUL packet 
floods. The Trinity v3 [19] introduces TCP random flag 
packet floods, TCP fragment floods, TCP established floods, 
and TCP RST packet floods. Along with the development of 
the Trinity came the myServer [15], that rely on external 
programs to conduct DoS and plague to simulate TCP ACK 
and TCP SYN flooding. Knight [20] is another light-weight 
and powerful IRC-based DDoS attack tool that can perform 
UDP flood attacks and SYN attacks. Knight can be considered 
an urgent pointer flooder [9]. An IRC-based DDoS tool based 
on Knight is Kaiten [20], which conducts UDP, TCP flood 
attacks, SYN, and PUSH+ACH attacks. 
4.3 Web-based DDoS Attack Tools 
Web-based DDoS attack tools were recently developed with 
the purpose of attacking the application layer, especially the 
Web server. IRC-based DDoS attack tools with the HTTP/S 
flooding function are used to attack a Web server, thus 
proving that attackers are increasingly adopting various tools 
to introduce DDoS attacks [5]. 
Unlike currently popular attack tools that can launch DDoS 
attacks, most organizations are unaware of the broad 
development over the last few years and are vulnerable to 
attackers, according to the Arbor Networks. Commercial 
services, along with downloadable tools, can launch attacks 
for a fee [5]. Therefore, we discuss the bot tools that launch 
DDoS attacks on the application layer. Approximately 20,000 
infected computers with multiple targets can destroy over 
90% of Internet sites [21]. A DDoS attack on the application 
layer is highly comparable to calling someone in the world 
from one Website, while the Web site indicates being out of 
service or displays ―the page cannot found.‖ Therefore, the 
server hosting the site cannot process all requests on the same 
site, in contrast to the compromising handler that injects the 
site with bots controlled by attackers. The attacker 
consequently demonstrates the use of different tools to 
execute a successful attack. In the following sections, three 
Web-based DDoS attack tools are described. 
4.3.1 BlackEnergy 
BlackEnergy [60] is a Web-based DDoS bot used by 
unidentified Russian hackers. BlackEnergy easily controls 
Web-based bots through minimal syntax and structure, 
resulting in the launch of various attacks. One or more 
Russian hackers had apparently developed this tool. 
Meanwhile, most BlackEnergy C&C systems are seen in 
Malaysia and in Russia, with Russian sites being the primary 
targets. One of the main features that BlackEnergy bot 
promote in forums is the capability to target more than one IP 
address per host name. This tool continues to be widely used 
to deny services from commercial Web sites. 
4.3.2 Low-Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) 
The LOIC is a Botnet-based DDoS attack tool that releases 
flooding in the server. This flooding apparently results from 
the large volume of HTTP traffic. However, this tool has been 
used recently by an anonymous group to facilitate malicious 
traffic through the Zeus Botnet, which is an advanced 
malware program that cannot be easily removed. The hacker 
group administered the largest attack in 2012 against famous 
Web sites, such as the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 
Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI) [22]. 
4.3.3 Aldi Botnet 
Aldi is a newer inexpensive DDoS bot that is growing in 
popularity. Recent data [59] suggests that there are at least 50 
distinct Aldi bot binaries that have been seen in the wild with 
44 unique Command & Control (C&C) points. As per Arbor 
company which monitors real time Internet traffic, this bot is 
active in Russia, Ukraine, US and Germany.  
5. CLASSIFICATION OF BOTNETS 
BASED DDOS ATTACKS 
The wide variety of DDoS attacks indicates the various 
conducted taxonomies of such attacks [9, 23-27]. New kinds 
of attacks are identified daily, and some remain undiscovered. 
In this work, we focus on Botnet based DDoS attacks that 
affect the application layer, especially the Web server [28]. 
The type of DDoS attack depends on the vulnerability of 
exploitation. The first type of attack is characterized by the 
consumption of the resources of the host. The victim can 
generally be a Web server or a proxy connected to the 
Internet. When the traffic load is high, packets are sent out to 
inform senders, who can either be legitimate users or attack 
sources, to reduce their sending rates. Legitimate users 
respond by decreasing their sending rates, whereas attack 
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sources maintain or even increase their sending rates. 
Consequently, resources of the host, such as the CPU or 
memory capacity, become depleted, and the host is hindered 
from servicing legitimate traffic. The second type of attack 
involves the consumption of network bandwidth. If malicious 
traffic in the network dominates the communication links, 
traffic from legitimate sources is obstructed. In effect, 
bandwidth DDoS attacks are more disruptive than attacks 
resulting in resource consumption [29]. Detail discussion of 
these attacks is given below: 
5.1 Net DDoS-based Bandwidth Attacks 
Net DDoS-based bandwidth attacks are normally introduced 
effectively from a single attack source that takes advantage of 
specific IP weaknesses. Examples of such attacks are SYN 
and ICMP flood attacks. 
5.1.1 SYN Flood Attacks 
A SYN flood attack utilizes a vulnerability of the TCP three-
way handshake, such that a server must contain a large data 
structure for incoming SYN packets regardless of authenticity. 
During SYN flood attacks, SYN packets are sent by the 
attacker with unknown or non-existent source IP addresses. 
The three-way handshake occurs when the server stores the 
request information from the client into the memory stack and 
then waits for client confirmation. Given that the source IP 
addresses in SYN flood attacks are unknown or non-existent, 
confirmation packets for the requests created by the SYN 
flood attack are not received. Each half-open connection 
accumulates in the memory stack until it times out. Hence, the 
memory stack becomes full. Consequently, no requests can be 
processed, and the services of the system are disabled. Thus, 
SYN flood attacks are considered one of the most powerful 
flooding methods [30]. 
5.1.2 ICMP Flood Attacks 
ICMP is based on the IP protocol that can diagnose the status 
of the network. An ICMP flood attack is a bandwidth attack 
that uses ICMP packets that can be directed to an individual 
machine or to an entire network. When a packet is sent from a 
machine to an IP broadcast address in the local network, all 
machines in the network receive the packet. When a packet is 
sent from a machine to the IP broadcast address outside the 
local network, the packet is delivered to all machines in the 
target network. Other types of ICMP flood attack are the 
SMURF and the Ping-of-Death attacks [31]. 
5.2 App-DDoS Attacks 
Attack power can be amplified by forcing the target to execute 
expensive operations. These attacks can consume all available 
corporate bandwidth and fill the pipes with illegitimate traffic. 
Routing protocols can also be affected and services are 
disrupted by either resetting the routing protocols or offering 
data that harm server operation [29].  
5.2.1 HTTP Flood Attacks  
An attack that bombards Web servers with HTTP requests is 
called an HTTP flood attack. According to [32], HTTP flood 
attacks are common in most Botnet software programs. To 
send an HTTP request, a valid TCP connection that requires a 
genuine IP address has to be established. Attackers send an 
HTTP request through the IP address of a bot and then 
formulate the HTTP requests in different ways to maximize 
the attack power or to avoid detection. An attacker, for 
example, can manipulate the Botnet to send HTTP requests to 
download a large file from the target. The file is then read by 
the target from the hard disk, stored in the memory, and 
finally loaded into the packets, which are sent back to the 
Botnet. Hence, a simple HTTP request can significantly 
consume resources in the CPU, memory, input/output devices, 
and outbound Internet link. 
However, the behavior of HTTP requests from the 
abovementioned example can be obvious. Repetitive requests 
for a large file can be detected and can then be blocked. 
Attackers mimic legitimate traffic by instructing the Botnet to 
send an HTTP request to the target Web site, analyze the 
replies, and then recursively follow the links. The HTTP 
requests from the attacker consequently become very similar 
to normal Web traffic, thus explaining the extreme difficulty 
in filtering this type of HTTP flood. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Distributed reflector denial of service (DRDoS) 
Attack 
 
5.2.2 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Flood 
Attacks 
The SIP is a widely supported standard for call set-up in 
Voice-over IP (VoIP). SIP proxy servers generally require 
public Internet access to accomplish the standard in accepting 
call set-up requests from any VoIP client. For scalability, SIP 
is typically implemented with UDP to become stateless. The 
attacker can flood the SIP proxy in one attack using SIP 
INVITE packets that pose as genuine source IP addresses. To 
avoid counter-hacking mechanisms, attackers can also launch 
the flood from a Botnet through a legitimate source IP 
address. Two victim categories emerge in this attack scenario. 
The first type comprises the SIP proxy servers with depleted 
server resources as a result of the processing of SIP INVITE 
packets, while their network capacity is consumed by the SIP 
INVITE flood. The SIP proxy server subsequently becomes 
incapable of providing VoIP service. The second type of 
victim is the call receiver, who becomes overwhelmed by fake 
VoIP calls and encounters difficulty in reaching legitimate 
callers [33]. 
5.2.3 Distributed Reflector Attacks 
Attackers should necessarily hide the true sources of their 
resulting attack traffic. Figure 4 illustrates the distributed 
reflector denial of service (DRDoS) attack, which hides attack 
traffic sources using third parties, such as routers or Web 
servers, during the relay of the attack traffic to the victim. 
These third parties are called reflectors. Any machine that 
responds to an incoming packet is a potential reflector. A 
DRDoS attack has three stages. In the second stage, after the 
attacker has gained control of ―zombies,‖ these ―zombies‖ are 
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instructed to send attack traffic information to the victims 
through the third parties, with the victim‘s IP address as the 
source IP address. In the third stage, the third parties send the 
reply traffic to the victim. This stage constitutes the DDoS 
attack. This type of attack had shut down a security research 
Web site (i.e. www.grc.com), in January 2002.  DRDoS has 
been considered a potent and increasingly prevalent Internet 
attack. Unlike a traditional DDoS attack, the traffic from a 
DRDoS attack is further dispersed through third parties, 
resulting in the increased distribution of the attack traffic and 
increasing the difficulty in the identification of the attack. 
Moreover, the source IP addresses of the attack traffic point to 
innocent third parties, thus complicating the process of tracing 
the attack traffic source. Finally, as observed by [34] and [35], 
DRDoS attacks can amplify the attack traffic, thereby making 
the attack even more potent. In the succeeding section, an 
actual example demonstrates the serious threat posed by 
DRDoS attacks. 
5.2.4 Domain Name System (DNS) Amplification 
Attacks 
An example of effective reflector attack is the DNS 
amplification attack shown in Figure 5. DNS provides a 
distributed infrastructure for the storage and association of 
different resource records (RR) with Internet domain names. 
DNS translates domain names into IP addresses. A recursive 
DNS server usually accepts a query and then resolves a given 
domain name for the requester. A recursive name server often 
contacts other authoritative name servers when necessary and 
subsequently returns the query response to the requester [36]. 
DNS query responses have disproportional sizes that normally 
comprise the original query and the answer. The query 
response packet is always larger than the query packet. 
Moreover, a query response can contain multiple RR, and 
some RR types can be very large. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: DNS Attack  
5.3 Trends that surprise in application-
layer DDoS attacks 
5.3.1 Bypass One Layer of Security 
In most cases, the applications that attackers are trying to 
exploit or target are well-known and must be ―allowed‖ 
through perimeter security devices such as firewalls or IPS 
devices. For example, by default, firewalls allow HTTP or 
DNS traffic. IPS devices are not much different as they 
enforce security policy by inspecting packets for signatures of 
known threats. DDoS attacks take advantage of the fact that 
firewalls and IPS devices will pass legitimate traffic—thus 
eliminating one layer of security for the attacker. 
5.3.2 Follow the Money 
Attackers see a major opportunity for extortion when 
applications are supporting high revenue-generating services. 
For example, an online gaming company is far more likely to 
pay an attacker to stop a DDoS attack that is costing millions 
per day in revenue than is an owner of a nonprofit Web site. 
5.3.3 More Bang for the Buck 
Some attacks cause significantly more collateral damage than 
others. For example, a DNS attack that targets a single DNS 
service provider impacts not only that provider but all of its 
customers as well.  
 Organizations are beginning to realize that the power to 
rapidly stop application-layer DDoS attacks that target 
Internet-facing services is imperative for business continuity 
and success. 
What makes this sort of attack different than a network or 
transport layer attack is that there is no way for upstream 
networking equipment to easily detect and filter out the 
attacker, since at the packet level, the traffic appears to be 
normal application traffic.  System administrators and 
application developers of potential targets must instead take 
measures to build DDoS protection into their network and 
application design.  Techniques such as caching and load 
balancing can increase the applications ability to absorb a 
flood of requests without becoming offline. 
6. BOTNETS BASED DDOS ATTACK 
INCIDENTS 
A DDoS attack is a major Internet threat as it can create a 
huge volume of unwanted traffic. DDoS attacks can prevent 
access to a particular resource, such as a Web site [37]. The 
first reported large-scale DDoS attack occurred in August 
1999 against a University [38]. The attack had shut down the 
victim‘s network for over two days. In 7 February 2000, a 
number of Websites went offline for several hours after an 
attack [38]. In some cases, DDoS attacks can produce 
approximately 1 Gbit/s of attack traffic against a single victim 
[39]. In February 2001, over 12,000 attacks were registered 
against more than 5,000 distinct victims over a three-week 
period [40]. The Coordination Center of the Computer 
Emergency Response Team was also attacked in May 2001, 
making the availability of their Website intermittent for more 
than two days.  
DDoS attacks usually continuously target DNS. In October 
2002, all root name servers underwent an exceptionally 
intensive DoS attack [41] with some non-received DNS 
requests to an outsourced DNS service in Akamai, which were 
meant to enhance service performance. In 2004, UK online 
bookmaking, betting, and gambling sites were overwhelmed 
by DoS attacks launched by unidentified attackers. The 
Internet-based business service of Al Jazeera, a provider of 
Arabic-language news services, was similarly attacked in 
January 2005. The text-to-speech translation application in the 
Sun Microsystem‘s Grid computing system was disabled 
during its opening day by a DoS attack in March 2006.  
In [39], the presence of roughly 2,000 to 3,000 active DoS 
attacks per week was described using an updated backscatter 
analysis. The attack record over a three-year period revealed 
68,700 attacks on over 34,700 distinct Internet hosts from 
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more than 5,300 organizations. Some DNS requests failed to 
reach a root name server because of the congestion caused by 
the DoS attack. In [41], another  major DoS attack occurred 
on 15 June 2004 against name servers in the Akamai Content 
Distribution Network. This attack blocked almost all access to 
such sites as Apple computer, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo 
for more than two hours. These companies supposedly 
outsourced their DNS service to Akamai for improved 
performance. 
6.1 Recent Botnet based DDoS Incidents 
DDoS attacks occur almost daily. Even well-known websites, 
such as Twitter, Facebook, Google, and other popular search 
engines, cannot escape these attacks that affect countless 
users. An eye-opener case was the DDoS incident that 
targeted the White House, FBI, DOJ [42], the Recording 
Business Association of America, Universal Music Websites, 
and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange [43]. A total of 80 
computers were compromised by the Botnet and up to 
250,000 were infected with malware during the attack. The 
attack traffic consumed 45 gigabytes per second according to 
the 7th Annual Report from the Arbor Company 2011 [5]. 
The outage lasted for seven days, the longest in 2010. In 2011, 
the longest attack ever recorded target a travel company, 
lasting for 80 days, 19 hours, 13 minutes, and 5 seconds. The 
average duration of DDoS attacks is 9 hours and 29 minutes. 
The observed DDoS incidents from 2011 to the first quarter of 
2012 are shown in Table 1. 
6.2 Financial Losses by Botnet based DDoS 
Attack 
Large-scale attacks cause substantial financial damage to 
companies relying on the Internet for their daily business. 
Direct (e.g., revenue loss during the attack) and indirect (e.g., 
customer loss attributed to degraded reputation) damages are 
also experienced. E-commerce and stock exchange sites spend 
millions of dollars to recover from these attacks, whereas 
other companies allocate a huge amount of money to defend 
themselves from possible hackers. As indicated by the survey 
of VeriSign respondents, expenditures reach up to $2.5 
million [57]. Table 2 shows the loss of revenue attributed to 
service disruption among large companies in the world. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
A Botnet-based DDoS attack is undoubtedly a serious Internet 
problem that challenges the growth rate and the public 
acceptance of online government and business sites. In this 
paper, a clear view of the Botnet based DDoS attack on the 
application layer, especially on the Web server, is presented. 
Incidents around the world and revenue losses of famous 
companies and government Web sites are also described, 
indicating that extreme care should be taken and a further 
study should be conducted to assess the size of the problem 
and then derive an optimal solution.  
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Table 1. Botnet-Based DDoS attack incidents 2011-2012 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Financial Losses by Botnet based DDoS Attack [58] 
 
Action Company A Company B Company C Company D 
Loss of Revenue per 
hour 
$19 million $240,000 $650,000 $190,000 
Line Business E-banking E-banking E-Commerce E-Commerce 
Average Loss in an 
attack 
$38-114 million $480,000-1,440,000 $1,300,000-3,900,000 $380,000-1,140,000 
 
The Target Date of Attack Details 
Tunisian Government Web sites 3 January 2011 Web site outage that included the president, prime minister, ministry 
of industry, ministry of foreign affairs, and stock exchange [44] 
FINE GAEL‘s News Web site 
www.finegael2011.com  
9 January 2011 One-night content outage by an anonymous attacker using the LOIC 
tool [45] 
Egyptian government Web sites 25 January 
2011 
Site went offline from the beginning of the revolution until the 
president stepped down [46]  
HB Gary Federal  5–6 February 
2011  
Hacked by dumping 68,000 e-mails from the system [47]  
Operation Ouraborus 16 February 
2011  
Threats from an anonymous attacker who hacked the site and caused 
irreversible damage [48]   
NEW YORK (CNN Money) 3 March 2011 The huge attack hit the company‘s data centers with tens of millions 
of packets per second [49]  
Operation Empire State Rebellion  14 March 2011 Threat from an anonymous attacker affecting the Bank of America 
[50] 
Operation Sony April 2011 Outage of the Play Station Network   [51]     
Spanish Police  12 Jun 2011 DDoS attack lasted for approximately one hour [52]  
Operation Malaysia 
Malaysia.gov.my  
15 Jun 2011 Outage of 91 Web sites of the Malaysian Government that started 
7:30 pm GMT [53] 
Operation Orlando 16 Jun 2011 Orlando government Web sites went offline daily because of the 
LOIC tool [54]  
Visa Card, Master Card, Wikileaks and 
www.paypal.com 
27 July 2011 Payment processing from Wikileaks through PayPal were 
continuously denied [55]  
Hong Kong stock exchange 15 August 
2011 
Hundreds of companies were affected with a single target [56] 
Justice.gov, MPAA.org, White House, the FBI, 
BMI.com, Copyright.com, Viacom, Anti-
piracy.be/nl, Vivendi.fr, Hadopi.fr, and 
ChrisDodd.com, 
19 Jan 2012 The largest attack for 2012 from an anonymous attacker who shut 
down all the affected sites for 10 minutes [22]  
